Asset Poverty in Urban China: A Study Using the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project by Huang, Jin et al.
 Campus Box 1196  One Brookings Drive  St. Louis, MO  63130-9906    (314) 935.7433    csd.wustl.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset Poverty in Urban China: 
A Study Using the 2002 Chinese Household 
Income Project 
 
Jin Huang 
School of Social Work, Saint Louis University 
 
Minchao Jin 
Center for Social Development 
 
Suo Deng 
Center for Social Development 
 
Baorong Guo 
School of Social Work, University of Missouri-St. Louis 
 
Li Zou 
Center for Social Development 
 
Michael Sherraden 
Center for Social Development 
 
2011 
 
CSD Working Papers 
No. 11-35 
A S S E T  P O V E R T Y  I N  U R B A N  C H I N A  
 
 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
1 
 
Asset Poverty in Urban China: 
A Study Using the 2002 Chinese Household 
Income Project 
 
 
 
Defining asset poverty as insufficiency of assets to satisfy household basic needs for a limited period of time, the study 
examines asset poverty rates in urban China using the 2002 survey data from the Chinese Household Income Project 
(CHIP). We find that asset poverty rates in urban China are lower than those of developed countries, in part due to 
Chinese households’ strong commitment to precautionary savings and the low poverty standards. However, the liquid 
asset poverty rate is five times that of the income poverty rate in urban China. Notably, the asset-poverty-gap ratio 
shows that most households in asset poverty have zero liquid assets or negative net worth. Given the increasingly 
common trend for lower-income individuals to experience transient poverty and income uncertainty, asset building ought 
to be an integral part of the anti-poverty agenda to protect the poor from economic hardship and provide them with 
opportunities for economic growth. 
Key words: poverty, asset distribution, income poverty, urban China, wealth 
Introduction 
The 2011 China private wealth study reported that the number of individuals with net worth over 10 
million yuan (approximately US$1.5 million at the current exchange rate; see Figure 1 for 
information on China-US currency exchange rates) had doubled since 2008, with the strongest 
growth from those with net worth greater than 100 million yuan (Bain & Company, Inc, 2011). 
These numbers reflect the unprecedented growth of wealth in Chinese households created by 
China’s economic advances.   
While the wealthy are generally doing well, even in the recession, poverty and social inequality have 
raised concerns among policymakers and researchers. China still had 254 million people living below 
the new international poverty standard in 2005—US$1.25 per day in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) dollars (World Bank, 2009)—despite the country’s concerted poverty reduction efforts over 
the last three decades. Along with this rapid economic growth, income and wealth inequalities have 
widened significantly, indicated by an increase in the overall Gini coefficient of income distribution 
from 0.16 prior to the market reform to 0.45 in the early 2000s and to 0.47 in 2007 (UNDP, 2008). 
The Gini coefficient of wealth distribution for the country as a whole was 0.45 in 1995 and 0.55 in 
2002 (Li & Zhao, 2007). Although the Gini coefficient of wealth is still relatively low compared to 
developed countries, its growth is remarkable given the fact that personal wealth accumulation in 
China did not actually start until two decades ago (Zhang & Ding, 2008) following the end of the 
socialist era.  
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Figure 1. The China-US Exchange Rates from 1995-2011 
 
Income disparity in China has been widely acknowledged, but much less attention has been given to 
asset inequality. Assets are stocks of resources owned by households at a certain point in time, 
including a home, business, savings, stocks, and bonds, among others. Compared to income, assets 
(wealth) not only serve as a storehouse for future consumption to protect household economic 
security, but are also an important facilitator of economic development (Caner & Wolff, 2004; Nam, 
Huang, & Sherraden, 2008). Household assets are an important determinant of income in the long 
run (Brandolini, Magri, Smeeding, 2010), affecting an individual’s opportunities for business startup, 
education, homeownership, and achievement of economic aspirations. In addition, the well-being of 
individuals and households depends on not only income but also asset ownership (Caner & Wolff, 
2004; Schneider, 2004; Sherraden, 1991).  
Using the 2002 survey data of the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP), this study examines 
asset inequality in urban China from the perspective of asset poverty, and with a focus on low-
wealth populations. Asset poverty refers to insufficiency of assets to satisfy household basic needs 
for a limited period of time (Haveman & Wolff, 2001). The asset-poverty perspective is expected to 
add valuable insights to income-poverty analysis. The study estimates asset-poverty rates in urban 
China based on different asset-poverty lines, investigates characteristics of asset-poor households, 
then examines interactions between asset poverty, income poverty, and public assistance, and finally, 
discusses policy implications of asset-poverty research in China.   
Background 
Asset distribution in urban China 
Household assets have grown substantially since China’s reform in the late 1970s (Zhao & Ding, 
2008), which has opened up various opportunities for individuals to accumulate significant amounts 
of assets. Reforms in areas such as land use, housing, state-owned enterprises, and finance have 
allowed people to become owners of their properties. Estimates from the CHIP show that per 
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capita net worth, defined as the sum of all assets minus non-housing liabilities, increased from 
13,700 yuan in 1995 to 46,100 yuan in 2002. At the household level, mean household net worth 
increased from 66,747 yuan (Li, Wei, & Gustafsson, 2000) to 306,000 yuan (Cheng, 2008) between 
1995 and 2007. Asset inequality also widened, with the highest decile group owning 34% of total net 
worth in contrast to only 2.8% owned by the two lowest groups (Zhao & Ding, 2008). The Gini 
coefficient of wealth distribution for urban areas was 0.48 in 2002 (Zhao & Ding, 2008), 0.56 in 
2005, and 0.58 in 2007 (Liang, Huo, & Liu, 2010). Housing and financial assets were the two largest 
categories of assets for urban households, constituting 70% and 90% of net worth in 1995 and 2002, 
respectively (Li & Zhao, 2007; Zhao & Ding, 2008). Liang and colleagues (2010) show that, in 2007, 
housing and financial assets contributed to 90% of asset inequality in urban China.  
Previous studies indicate that asset accumulation for urban households in China is highly related to 
household demographics and individual characteristics, including age, gender, health status, political 
status, occupation, education, and income (Liang, Huo, & Liu, 2010; Meng, 2007). These 
demographic characteristics likely affect household asset-poverty status as well. Some of the findings 
regarding the association between household assets and demographics are different from those 
found in developed countries (i.e., Caner & Wolff, 2004). Several studies even generate different 
findings on the same demographic characteristics, such as age, occupation, and education. For 
instance, consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis, one study finds a hump-shaped age-savings profile 
in the Household Assets Investment Study: household assets peaked at age 50 in the 2005 data and 
at age 60 in the 2007 data (Liang, Huo, & Liu, 2010). As older adults are more likely to own a house, 
the change in the peak age from 2005 to 2007 could be caused by rising housing prices. In the two 
cross-sectional data sets (1995 and 1999), Meng (2007) also identifies the same age-asset pattern with 
different peak ages (52 and 76, respectively). Li, Wei, and Gustafsson (2000), however, report a 
different savings pattern with two peaks at ages 35-44 and 60-64 in urban China, and a recent study 
of Chamon and Prasad (2010) presents a U-shape age-savings profile, in contrast to Liang et al. 
(2010).  
Female-headed households and those headed by individuals with excellent health, high income, or 
membership in the Communist party have more wealth than their counterparts (Liang, Huo, & Liu, 
2010; Meng, 2007). Household assets also vary by occupation. In 2005, business owners held the 
highest level of household net worth, followed by teachers, technical workers, and government 
employees, but by 2007, the average household net worth of government employees exceeded that 
of private business owners (Liang, Huo, & Liu, 2010). In addition, a positive correlation is found 
between household assets and heads’ educational attainment in two studies (Liang, Huo, & Liu, 
2010; Meng, 2007) but not a third (Li, Wei, & Gustafsson, 2000).  
According to Chamon and Prasad (2010), one explanation for these variations in findings is that 
household asset accumulation, to a large extent, is constructed by institutional and policy structures 
rather than individual and household characteristics. In contrast to many developed countries, 
institutional structures in China have changed drastically during recent economic and policy 
transitions, resulting in varied relationships between demographic characteristics and wealth 
accumulation. For instance, Meng (2007) and Zhao and Ding (2008) find that the housing reform 
policy in the early 1990s significantly contributed to asset inequality in urban China. Feng, He, & 
Sato (2009) suggest that pension reform in the mid-1990s may also have changed household saving 
behavior. Furthermore, Wei and Zhang (2009) argue that even the imbalanced sex ratio, a result of 
the one child policy, has induced families with male children to favor asset accumulation over 
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consumption. As these examples demonstrate, asset inequality in current China is a product of 
“historically and culturally defined processes created by contemporaneous political, economic, and 
social forces” (Davis & Feng, 2009). 
A series of economic reforms and institutional transitions in China have provided tremendous 
opportunities for wealth accumulation. However, as reflected by increasing wealth inequality, these 
opportunities are not equally distributed. Overall, political or economic elites have been the primary 
beneficiaries of these institutional arrangements, enjoying the advantages of a multidimensional 
stratification system including redistributive power, rent-seeking ability, and market power (Davis & 
Feng, 2009), and therefore are able to accumulate more wealth than other groups (Meng, 2007). 
Despite the widely acclaimed institutional changes in the reform process over the past three decades, 
many individuals have been excluded from these asset accumulation opportunities. For instance, in 
the reform of state-owned enterprises, many urban workers lost out to managerial cadres and new 
capitalist owners during the sales of state-owned industrial assets to individuals. Unfortunately, few 
studies have systematically examined how these institutional changes excluded certain populations, 
especially those with low income and low wealth, from building household assets.   
Asset poverty research 
The concept of asset poverty can be applied to an examination of asset inequality. Most current 
poverty research focuses only on income despite efforts to include wealth in poverty measures 
(Brandolini, Magri, & Smeeding, 2010; Nam, Huang, & Sherraden, 2008). Oliver and Shapiro (1995) 
consider households as asset poor if their asset value is zero or less. Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 
(2011) define households’ financial fragility as the lack of capacity to come up with $2,000 in 30 
days. Haveman and Wolff (2001) categorize households as asset poor if their access to “wealth-type 
resources is insufficient to enable them to meet its basic needs for some limited period of time.” 
Haveman and Wolff (2001) and Caner and Wolff (2004) set this “period of time” at three months 
based on the estimated duration of unemployment (2.2-4.2 months), a major event causing 
economic hardship. Brandolini, Magri, and Smeeding (2010) indicate that the reference period of 
three months is consistent with the estimates of desired precautionary savings. “Basic needs” is 
measured by the family-size conditioned poverty threshold proposed by a National Academy of 
Sciences panel (Citro & Michael, 1995). Haveman and Wolff (2001) and Caner and Wolff (2004) 
estimate asset-poverty rates with three forms of assets, including net worth, net worth minus home 
equity, and liquid assets. Net worth is defined as the sum of all marketable assets less the value of all 
debts. Liquid assets include the values of cash and other kinds of easily monetizable asset items.  
According to Caner and Wolff (2004), the U.S. asset poverty rate in 1999 was 26% when measured 
with net worth, 40% with net worth minus home equity, and 42% with liquid assets. The level of 
asset poverty stayed almost the same from 1984 to 1999. Generally, asset-poverty rates are two to 
four times higher than the income-poverty rate (Caner & Wolff, 2004). Households headed by 
disadvantaged populations—such as ethnic minority groups, females, individuals younger than 34, 
individuals with children, individuals with low educational attainment, and renters—are more likely 
to experience asset poverty (Haveman & Wolff, 2004; Lusardi, Schneider, & Tufano, 2011).  
A similar pattern of asset poverty has been identified in other developed countries. Using the data 
from the Luxembourg Wealth Study, Brandolini, Magri, and Smeeding (2010) study asset poverty in 
several wealthy countries (including Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, UK, and 
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US), and report that the asset-poverty rate is 2-3 times the income-poverty rate in most of these 
countries.  
We note that the asset-poverty measure proposed by Haveman and Wolff (2001) defines assets as a 
storehouse for future consumption. This measure takes into consideration only the insurance role of 
household assets (Brandolini, Magri, & Smeeding, 2010). In fact, the role of assets in defining 
poverty can also be examined from a development perspective (Brandolini, Magri, & Smeeding, 
2010; Carter & Barett, 2006; Nam, Huang, & Sherraden, 2008). Assets can promote the general 
capability of individuals, help them achieve goals beyond short-term consumption smoothing, open 
up a variety of opportunities, and determine long-term prospects. Carter and Barett (2006) propose 
an asset-based approach to poverty, and draw the asset poverty line at which to distinguish 
households likely to stay in income poverty from those that may grow out of income poverty 
conditional on asset accumulation. Considering the role of assets in future development, the asset-
poverty threshold can be set at an asset value large enough for home down payment, business start-
up, or children’s post-secondary education (Nam, Huang, & Sherraden, 2008).  
Based on previous literature on asset poverty, this study examines asset inequality in urban China 
from the perspective of asset poverty using the 2002 survey data of Chinese Household Income 
Project (CHIP). 
Data and Methods 
Data 
The 2002 CHIP is a nationally representative data set collected by the Institute of Economics at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences through a series of questionnaire-based interviews and coded 
on-site observations. Using a multistage stratified probability sampling method, the 2002 CHIP 
urban sample includes 12 provinces from the eastern, central, and western regions of China, and 
contains 6,835 households and 20,632 individuals from 77 cities. The survey collects comprehensive 
information on household demographics, income sources, financial and physical assets, and social 
benefit receipt, among others. 
Definition of asset poverty 
Household assets. The study adopts the definition of asset poverty developed by Haveman and Wolff 
(2001): a household is considered asset poor if its assets are insufficient to enable the household to 
meet its basic needs for three months. Following Haveman and Wolff (2001) and Caner and Wolff 
(2004), household assets are measured in three forms: net worth, net worth minus home equity, and 
liquid assets. The CHIP provides information on multiple asset categories, including home equity, 
savings, stocks, bonds, money lent out, investment in enterprises or business, housing funds, 
commercial insurance, collections, durable goods, productive fixed assets, and other assets. Net 
worth consists of all the asset categories mentioned above net of total household debts. Net worth 
minus home equity excludes home equity in the calculation of net worth. Liquid assets are the sum 
of stocks, bonds, and savings in CDs or regular savings accounts.  
Asset poverty line. The asset poverty line refers to a minimum level of household consumption needs 
for a period of three months. We do not use China’s official poverty line to measure household 
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basic needs because it is based on a food-energy-intake method (2,100 calories per capita per day) 
for rural areas only. This rural poverty line (785 yuan in 2002) is far below the international poverty 
standard and not considered appropriate for urban areas of China (Khan, 2004). Instead, we use 
three approaches to measure household basic needs in urban areas of China. The first is the 
Minimum Living Standard (MLS) set by local governments to determine a household’s eligibility for 
Minimum Living Standard Assistance, the safety net for the urban poor in China (Gao, Garfinkel, & 
Zhai, 2009). As an estimation of the local monthly expenses on basic necessities, the MLS takes into 
consideration about 20 essential goods and services, including food, clothing, shelter, utility, medical 
care, and tuition expenses (Chen & Barrientos, 2006). The MLS-based asset-poverty line is the 
product of three terms: the MLS, household size, and the period of three months. Information 
regarding the 2002 MLS is collected by the authors from official websites of local governments. For 
cities where the MLS information is not available, we use the MLS of the central city in the same 
province as a proxy.  
Secondly, we use a specific poverty line for urban China developed by Khan (2004) to measure 
household basic needs, which has been used in several other studies (e.g., Gao, Garfinkel, & Zhai, 
2009; Gustafsson & Deng, 2007). This poverty line is set at 2,534 yuan per capita per year, almost 
two times the World Bank poverty line (US$1.25 per day in 2005 PPP dollars). Using this method, 
the asset poverty line is the product of household size and one quarter of Khan’s poverty line.  
For the third approach, we use the monthly household minimum expenditure reported by 
household heads in the CHIP as a measure of household basic needs. Therefore, the asset-poverty 
line is the product of self-reported minimum expenditure and three months. This approach 
considers poverty from the perspective of consumption rather than income, and the self-reported 
minimum expenditure allows the subjective poverty line to be estimated.  
Other measures 
To examine the characteristics of asset-poor households, the study includes two groups of 
demographic variables. Household head’s characteristics include gender, age (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 
and 60 and above), employment status (employed or not), ethnic groups (Han versus minority 
groups), marital status (married versus otherwise), health condition (very good versus otherwise), 
political party (Communist party versus otherwise), and education (less than high school, high 
school or equivalent, two-three years of college, and four years of college or above). Household 
characteristics are household size, presence of a child in the household (younger than 18), presence of 
an elderly adult in the household (older than 64), and household income quartiles.  
Analysis  
The study first reports demographic characteristics and asset distributions of the sample. Using 
different asset-poverty lines, we then calculate asset-poverty rates and asset-poverty-gap ratios at the 
household level with three asset indicators. The asset-poverty rate provides an estimation of the 
share of households living under the asset-poverty line, while the asset-poverty-gap ratio, indicated 
by a share of the asset-poverty line, measures the amount of assets households need to grow out of 
asset poverty. In the discussion of the study results, we focus on liquid asset poverty in particular. 
Compared with the other two asset forms, net worth and net worth minus home equity, liquid assets 
precisely reflect the role of assets in consumption smoothing. Asset items included in the other two 
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measures, such as home or business, are less likely to be liquidized for consumption when negative 
income shocks occur.   
We further tabulate the sample by households’ asset-poverty and income-poverty status. Income-
poverty lines are defined similar to asset-poverty lines, with a different reference period (12 months). 
The tabulation of asset poverty and income poverty results in four categories of households (see 
Figure 2): the income and asset poor, the income poor only, the asset poor only, and the income and 
asset non-poor. The income-poor-only group has assets above the asset-poverty line, while the 
asset-poor-only group has an income greater than the income poverty line. Finally, a logit model and 
a multinomial model are conducted to examine if household demographics are associated with 
household asset-poverty status and the four categories in Figure 2. The sample has few missing 
values, so we use listwise deletion in all analyses.  
Figure 2. Cross-tabulation of Household Income and Asset Poverty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Income and asset poor 
 
Income and asset  
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Asset poor only 
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics (N=6,835) 
Variables 
Full Sample Liquid Asset-Poor Sample 
Percentage or Mean Percentage or Mean 
Household Head’s Characteristics    
    Gender (1=Female) 32.77 28.21 
    Age   
        20-29 2.11 2.85 
        30-39 22.55 22.86 
        40-49 35.49 35.63 
        50-59 23.83 22.69 
        60 and above 16.02 15.96 
    Ethnicity (1=Han) 96.15 95.60 
    Political party (1=Communist party) 37.67 27.87 
    Marital status (1=married) 94.06 92.15 
    Employment status (1=employed) 70.48 66.95 
    Education level   
        Below high school  36.22 46.98 
        High school or equivalent  36.88 36.61 
        Two or Three-year college 18.10 10.45 
        Four-year college and above 8.79 5.96 
    Health condition (1=very good) 20.43 21.66 
Household Characteristics    
    Household size (mean, SD) 3.02 (.79) 3.09 (.81) 
    Number of children (mean, SD) .56 (.56) .61 (.59) 
    Number of older adults (mean, SD) .23 (.16) .23 (.53) 
    Household income (mean, SD) 23757.23 (15558.55) 16411.45 (11045.39) 
    Region and Province    
        Eastern region:       
Beijing 7.07 2.24 
                        Liaoning 10.20 8.89 
                        Jiangsu  10.67 9.49 
                        Guangdong  7.96 3.19 
        Central region:       
Shanxi 9.35 13.96 
                        Anhui  7.21 7.42 
                        Henan  9.95 11.04 
                        Hubei  9.83 9.92 
        Western region:      
Chongqing 4.11 3.71 
                        Sichuan  8.56 9.23 
                        Yunnan  9.31 13.03 
                        Gansu  5.78 7.85 
Asset-poverty Line (mean, SD)   
    Minimum Living Standard  1774.16 (662.45)  
    Khan poverty line 2630.32 (687.84)  
    Self-reported minimum expenditures  3640.03 (1986.97)  
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Results 
Sample characteristics  
The first column of Table 1 reports demographic characteristics of the study sample. Of the 6,385 
households, 33% are headed by females. Most household heads are middle aged, and only 2% are 
younger than 30. A small proportion of household heads are members of ethnic minority groups 
(5%), and 38% are members of the Communist Party of China. Most household heads are married 
(94%) and employed (70%). About one-third of householders have educational attainment below 
high school, and another one-third have a high school diploma or equivalent. Nearly 20% have 2-3 
years of college, and 9% have at least a bachelor’s degree. Regarding health condition, 20% of 
household heads report having “very good” health. On average, there are .56 children and .23 older 
adults in these households. The mean household income in 2002 was 23,757 yuan (SD=15,559 
yuan). The CHIP collects household information from 12 provinces in the eastern, central, and 
western regions; Table 1 reports the percentage of the sample from each province.  
Also shown in Table 1, the means of the three asset-poverty lines proposed by the study are 1,774 
yuan, 2,620 yuan, and 3,640 yuan. The MLS, as the lowest asset-poverty line in this study, is 70% of 
Khan’s line, and 50% of the self-reported minimum household expenditure.  
Household asset distribution in urban China 
The first column of Table 2 describes the mean and median of liquid assets, net worth, and net 
worth excluding home equity for the study sample. Distributions of asset categories are shown in the 
table as well. The mean and median liquid assets are 28,007 yuan and 15,000 yuan, respectively. 
Compared to the 1995 CHIS (Li, Wei, & Gustafsson, 2000), mean liquid assets increases by almost 
200%. Nearly 13% of households do not have any liquid assets. The mean liquid assets are 4,000 
yuan higher than the average household income, and 3.5 times as large as the 2002 per capital 
disposable income of urban residents (7,703 yuan; NBSC, 2003). Given that the average household 
size is about three, the amount of liquid assets owned by an average urban household approximates 
its annual household income.  
The mean of liquid assets is about 20% of the average household net worth (128,577 yuan), and 
60% of net worth net of home equity (48,357 yuan). The average household net worth doubles from 
1995 to 2002 (Li, Wei, & Gustafsson, 2000). Nearly 85% of households in the sample are 
homeowners; home equity accounts for about two-third of the total net worth. In other words, a 
home seems to be the most commonly owned asset category and the most important asset for urban 
households. Other important asset categories are savings in CDs and regular savings accounts, and 
durable goods. 
A S S E T  P O V E R T Y  I N  U R B A N  C H I N A  
 
 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
10 
Table 2. Mean and Median of Household Assets 
Asset Categories 
 Full Sample   Liquid Asset-Poor Sample 
Mean (SD) Median Mean (SD) Median 
Liquid Assets  28006.63 (41242.28) 15000.00 265.38 (555.33) 0 
   Percent of zero liquid assets 12.70  74.89  
Net Worth 128577.20 (150392.00) 94000.00 65586.98 (78237.33) 6038.64 
   Percent of negative or zero net worth 1.77  7.51  
New Worth-Home Equity (NW-HE) 48356.50 (66250.08) 31000.00 11098.02 (29788.02) 5500.00 
   Percent of negative or zero NW-HE 2.41  16.91  
Savings in CD accounts 18057.49 (30250.58) 10000.00 61.88 (304.23) 0 
Savings in regular savings accounts 5019.50 (10182.96) 2000.00 198.29 (464.17) 0 
Stocks 3748.95 (15391.02) 0 3.84 (65.35) 0 
Bonds 1180.68 (8018.08) 0 1.36 (32.91) 0 
Money lent out 1434.66 (8735.33) 0 665.70 (5662.7) 0 
Family business  1103.62 (10709.89) 0 1140.93 (9774.25) 0 
Investment in enterprises 509.32 (4791.25) 0 375.32 (3915.16) 0 
Housing fund 3124.65 (6275.95) 0 1536.41 (4093.00) 0 
Commercial insurance 1418.31 (6475.47) 0 516.70 (3044.39) 0 
Collections 532.05 (4294.06) 0 160.91 (1172.34) 0 
Durable goods 9168.87 (26851.69) 5000.00 6039.72 (14669.82) 3000.00 
Self-owned productive fixed assets 2461.91 (22314.11) 0 296.59 (2015.94) 0 
Homeownership .84 (.37) 1 .79 (.41) 1 
House value 84450.54 (113691.60) 60000.00 59915.92 (71413.84) 45000.00 
Other assets 1871.73 (8071.26) 0 1200.42 (6377.08) 0 
Total household debts 5505.09 (53508.30) 0 8686.23 (21797.87) 0 
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Asset-poverty rates by different asset measures and asset-poverty lines 
Table 3 shows estimated asset-poverty rates using the three different asset measures (liquid assets, 
net worth, and net worth excluding home equity) and asset-poverty lines (the MLS, Khan’s poverty 
line, and the self-reported minimum household expenditure). Among the three asset measures, liquid 
assets generate the highest estimates of asset-poverty rates: 17% of households in the sample are 
asset poor according to the MLS asset-poverty line, which is five times the income-poverty rate 
(16.96/3.34=5.1). The liquid asset-poverty rate rises by less than one percentage point for Khan’s 
poverty line and four percentage points for the self-reported minimum expenditure. Although Table 
3 only reports the liquid assets poverty rate, the ratio between household liquid assets and the self-
reported minimum expenditure actually has a median value of five in the sample. This means that 
the amount of liquid assets owned by a typical urban household could support its minimum 
consumption for about 15 months (median value 5*3 months). This estimation is higher than 
estimates regarding household precautionary savings in developed countries (Brandolini, Magri, & 
Smeeding, 2010). 
Table 3. Asset Poverty and Income Poverty in Rural China (percent) 
Household Economic 
Resources 
Asset and Income Poverty Rates (%) 
MLS Khan’s Poverty line Self-reported 
expenditure 
Liquid assets 16.96 17.51 21.02 
Net worth 2.18 2.30 2.39 
New worth-home equity 5.05 5.35 6.36 
Household income 3.34 5.24 9.76 
 Median Asset-Poverty Gap Ratios for the Asset Poor (%) 
Liquid assets 100 100 100 
Net worth 285 178 163 
New worth-home equity 100 100 100 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that asset-poverty rates estimated from the net worth measure are the 
lowest, because of its inclusive nature as a measure of wealth-type economic resources (Caner & 
Wolff, 2004). Nearly 3% of households have net worth not sufficient to meet consumption needs 
during a three-month period, regardless of which poverty line is used. When home equity is 
excluded from household net worth, asset-poverty rates rise to about 5% or 6%. Overall, the 
estimates of asset-poverty rates in urban China are much lower than those in developed countries 
(Brandolini, Magri, & Smeeding, 2010).  
Another interesting finding is that asset-poverty rates are more consistent across different poverty 
lines than income-poverty rates. For instance, the income-poverty rate based on the self-reported 
minimum expenditure (10%) is about three times the income-poverty rate using the MLS poverty 
line (3%), and the income-poverty rate using Khan’s poverty line (5%) is nearly two times the rate 
obtained by using the MLS poverty line. However, for liquid asset-poverty rates, the ratios are 1.24 
and 1.20, respectively.  
A smaller disparity in asset-poverty rates over different poverty lines can be explained by the fact 
that most asset-poor households have nearly zero liquid assets or negative net worth. These 
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households are asset poor by all measures. Asset-poverty-gap ratios reported in the second panel of 
Table 3 support this reasoning. The asset-poverty-gap ratio uses a share of the asset-poverty line to 
indicate the amount of assets that households need to avoid asset poverty. It is calculated by dividing 
the difference between the asset-poverty line and household assets by the asset-poverty line. Median 
values of asset-poverty-gap ratios are all at least 100% in Table 3, indicating that asset-poor 
households typically do not own any assets or have negative assets. More specifically, about 75% of 
liquid-asset-poor households do not have any liquid assets, and more than 80% of net-worth-poor 
households have negative net worth.  
The second column of Table 2 shows asset ownership and asset distributions for households with 
liquid assets below the MLS poverty line. The average liquid assets (265 yuan) owned by asset-poor 
households is 1% of that owned by the entire sample. Three out of every four asset-poor 
households have zero liquid assets. Median savings in CDs or regular savings accounts is zero for 
these households. In addition, the average household debt (8,686 yuan) is nearly 60% higher than 
that of the entire sample (5,505 yuan). Nonetheless, the distributions of homeownership, family 
business, and durable goods are relatively balanced in the full sample and the asset-poor sample.  
Asset-poverty rates by demographic characteristics 
Table 4 presents liquid-asset-poverty rates by demographic characteristics using only the rates based 
on the MLS poverty line. First, households headed by males have a higher asset-poverty rate than 
those headed by females (18% vs. 15%). Meng (2007) also finds that female-headed households 
owned more assets in urban China. There is a negative association between household head’s age 
and the asset-poverty rate. The youngest group (aged 20-29) has the highest asset-poverty rate 
(23%), and the age group of 50-59 (pre-retirement stage) has the lowest asset-poverty rate (16%), 
consistent with life-cycle theory. As expected, the liquid asset-poverty rate is lower for households 
headed by individuals who are married, employed, have more education, own a home, or are a 
member of the Communist party. The asset-poverty rate is higher for those who are ethnic 
minorities. Households headed by individuals with “very good” health have a higher asset-poverty 
rate than their counterparts, although Liang et al. (2010) find that health condition is positively 
related to the amount of household assets. There is also a negative correlation between household 
income and the asset-poverty rate. Households in the lowest income quartile have a liquid-asset-
poverty rate (32%) that is four times higher than those in the highest income quartile (6%). Finally, 
geographic disparities in asset poverty are found both within and across different regions. Among 
the 12 provinces, four in the eastern region have the lowest asset-poverty rates. The highest asset-
poverty rate (25% for Shanxi) is almost five times the lowest asset-poverty rate (5% for Beijing).  
To supplement the analysis in Table 4, the second column of Table 1 reports the characteristics of 
the liquid-asset-poor sample based on the MLS poverty line. The relationships between asset 
poverty and these demographic characteristics are further explored in the following multivariate 
analyses. 
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Table 4. Asset-Poverty Rate by Demographic Characteristics 
Demographic Characteristics Asset-Poverty Rate (%) 
Household head’s gender***  
  Female 14.60 
  Male 18.11 
Household head’s age  
  20-29 22.92 
  30-39 17.20 
  40-49 17.03 
  50-59 16.14 
  >=60 16.89 
Household head’s employment status***  
  Employed 16.11 
  Not employed 18.98 
Household head’s ethnicity**   
  Han 16.86 
  Ethnic minority groups 19.39 
Household head’s member of party***  
  Communist Party 12.54 
  Others  19.63 
Household head’s marital status***   
  Married 16.61 
  Not married 22.41 
Household head’s education***   
  Below high school 22.00 
  High school or equivalent 16.85 
  Two or Three-year college 9.79 
  Four-year college and above 11.50 
Household head’s health condition   
  Very good 17.98 
  Others 16.70 
Types of Family *  
  With children 17.68 
  Without children 16.15 
Homeownership***  
   Owners 22.22 
   Renters 15.93 
Household income quartiles***  
   1st quartiles 32.32 
   2nd quartiles 17.77 
   3rd quartiles 11.97 
   4th quartiles 5.79 
Region and Province***  
Eastern region:      
Beijing 5.38 
                   Liaoning 14.78 
                   Jiangsu 15.09 
                   Guangdong 6.80 
Central region:      
Shanxi 25.35 
                   Anhui 17.48 
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                   Henan 18.82 
                   Hubei 17.11 
Western region:     
Chongqing 15.30 
                   Sichuan 18.29 
                   Yunnan 23.74 
                   Gansu 23.04 
Note: Chi-square tests are conducted to detect statistically significant differences in 
asset-poverty rates across demographic groups. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.001. 
Asset poverty, income poverty, and public assistance 
Households in the sample can be categorized into four groups by their status of income poverty and 
asset poverty. We cross-tabulate household income poverty and liquid asset poverty using different 
poverty lines, and the results are presented in Table 5. In the first panel, the poverty line is defined 
by the MLS. Less than 2% of households are both income- and liquid-asset poor. This group is the 
most vulnerable, and nearly 40% of households in this category receive some kind of public 
assistance, including the minimum living standard subsidy, living hardship subsides from employers, 
and so on.  
Table 5. Liquid Asset Poverty, Income Poverty, and Public Assistance 
Categories of Income and  
Liquid Asset poverty Percentage (%) 
Percentage covered by Public 
Assistance (%) 
Panel I. MLS Poverty line   
Income and liquid asset poor 1.80 37.40 
Income poor 1.54 12.38 
Liquid asset poor  15.16 6.47 
Income and liquid asset non-poor 81.50 2.55 
Panel II. Khan’s Poverty Line   
Income and liquid asset poor 2.71 31.89 
Income poor 2.53 15.61 
Liquid asset poor  14.81 5.53 
Income and liquid asset non-poor 79.96 2.31 
Panel III. Self-reported Minimum Expenditure   
Income and liquid asset poor 3.99 16.91 
Income poor 5.77 7.36 
Liquid asset poor  17.03 6.28 
Income and liquid asset non-poor 73.21 2.36 
 
The second group (1.5% of the full sample), while also experiencing income poverty, has liquid 
assets higher than the MLS asset-poverty line. With a buffer of household assets, this group (the 
income poor only) is better off than the first group (the income and asset poor). Nearly 12% of 
households in the second group receive public assistance. Combining the first and second groups, 
about half of income-poor households are not asset poor (1.54/(1.80+1.54)); the percentage is even 
higher if using the self-reported minimum expenditure as the poverty line for estimation. Poor 
households are at greater risk of economic insecurity and are more motivated to save.  
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The third category (15% of the full sample) comprises households with sufficient income to meet 
basic living standards but insufficient liquid assets for protection from negative income shocks (the 
liquid-asset poor). Only 6% of this group receives income support from public assistance programs. 
The fourth group has income and assets both greater than the poverty lines (the income and liquid-
asset non-poor). Although the percentage of households receiving public assistance varies in the 
four categories, altogether only 4% of the households in the sample are supported by public 
assistance programs.   
Determining the characteristics of the asset poor 
Results of logit models. We further conduct multivariate analyses to examine the relationship between 
household demographic characteristics and asset poverty. The first model in Table 6 presents the 
results of a logit regression on liquid asset poverty for the MLS poverty line. Most estimates are 
consistent with those reported in Table 4. In contrast to previous studies on asset poverty in 
developed countries, the results indicate that female-headed households have a lower probability of 
asset poverty than male-headed households. Households headed by individuals less than 30 years old 
are more likely to experience asset poverty. Households headed by individuals who are members of 
the Communist party, married, and/or home owners, are less likely to be asset poor compared to 
their counterparts; all these demographic characteristics reduce the odds of having liquid-asset 
poverty by about 20%-30%. Interestingly, compared to the group without a high school diploma, 
those headed by individuals with some college are less likely to be asset poor, and the other two 
education categories (a high school degree or equivalent and a bachelor degree or above) are not 
statistically significant in the analysis. This suggests that the bivariate association between household 
head’s education and asset poverty reported in Table 4 is mainly confounded with some other 
demographic characteristics, such as age and household income.  
Household size has a positive association with the probability of asset poverty. After controlling for 
household size, having a child reduces a household’s propensity for asset poverty, a result 
inconsistent with the bivariate analysis reported in Table 4. The results also confirm the importance 
of household income in asset poverty. Households with higher levels of income are more likely to 
have liquid assets for short-term consumption needs.  
The second model examines liquid asset poverty (based on Khan’s poverty line) as the dependent 
variable, and the test yields results consistent with those from Model 1. The dependent variable of 
the third model in Table 6 is liquid asset poverty based on the poverty line of the self-reported 
minimum expenditure. Most estimates are consistent with those in the first two models, but three 
age categories (30-39, 40-49, and 50-59) lose their statistical significances in this analysis. In addition, 
geographic disparity in asset poverty in Model 3 appears smaller than that in Models 1 and 2. For 
instance, asset-poverty rates for eastern provinces are not statistically different in Model 3. This may 
imply that the self-reported minimum expenditure, as a poverty line, is better than others in 
adjusting household consumption needs for different life stages and geographies. It is likely that the 
self-reported minimum expenditure, to some extent, reflects an individual’s expectation for future 
income uncertainty. 
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Table 6. Results of Logistic Regression: Asset Poverty and Demographic Characteristics 
Variables 
Model 1: MLS Model 2: Khan’s Line 
Model 3: Self-reported 
Expenditure 
Coefficients SE Coefficients SE Coefficients SE 
Household head’s Characteristics        
   Gender (ref: Male) -0.206** 0.083  -0.208** 0.082  -0.163** 0.075  
   Age categories (ref: 20-29)       
30-39  -0.454** 0.225  -0.523** 0.221  -0.325 0.211  
40-49 -0.489** 0.221  -0.583*** 0.217  -0.309 0.207  
50-59 -0.507** 0.234  -0.621*** 0.230  -0.355 0.219  
60 and above  -0.699*** 0.256  -0.809*** 0.252  -0.514* 0.240  
   Ethnic groups (ref: Han) -0.052 0.177  -0.019 0.174  0.055  0.159  
   Political party (ref: not a Communist party 
member) 
-0.237*** 0.080  -0.239*** 0.080  -0.232*** 0.072  
   Marital status (ref: not married) -0.343** 0.141  -0.320** 0.141  -0.302** 0.130  
Employment (ref: unemployed)  -0.144 0.099  -0.093 0.099  -0.082 0.093  
Education (ref: <high school)        
High school or equivalent -0.011 0.081  -0.013 0.080  -0.002 0.075  
Two- or three-year college -0.400*** 0.122  -0.396*** 0.121  -0.237** 0.107  
Four-year college or above 0.008  0.156  0.001  0.154  0.042  0.139  
   Health condition (1=very good) -0.020 0.085  -0.014 0.085  -0.021 0.078  
Household Characteristics        
   Household size 0.383***  0.052  0.419***  0.051  0.241***  0.048  
   Whether having children (ref: no) -0.243** 0.096  -0.299*** 0.096  -0.198** 0.088  
   Whether having older adults (ref: no) -0.085 0.113  0.014  0.111  0.008  0.104  
   Homeownership (ref: no) -0.249*** 0.086  -0.265*** 0.086  -0.191** 0.081  
   Household income quartiles        
      2nd quartile -0.770*** 0.086  -0.798*** 0.085  -0.614*** 0.080  
      3rd quartile -1.175*** 0.099  -1.211*** 0.099  -0.934*** 0.090  
      4th quartile -1.876*** 0.135  -1.843*** 0.133  -1.589*** 0.118  
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   Province of residence (ref: Beijing)       
        Liaoning 0.362  0.239  0.560**  0.253  0.236  0.199  
        Jiangsu 0.473**  0.238  0.662***  0.252  0.215  0.199  
        Guangdong -0.138 0.272  -0.196 0.295  -0.084 0.221  
        Shanxi 0.861***  0.237  1.173***  0.251  0.674***  0.198  
        Anhui 0.411*  0.249  0.676**  0.261  0.325  0.208  
        Henan 0.431*  0.240  0.700***  0.253  0.198  0.201  
        Hubei 0.538**  0.239  0.830***  0.252  0.488**  0.198  
        Chongqing 0.404  0.274  0.665***  0.285  0.493**  0.227  
        Sichuan 0.436*  0.242  0.723***  0.255  0.389*  0.201  
        Yunnan 1.076***  0.235  1.338***  0.249  1.019***  0.195  
        Gansu 0.786***  0.250  1.050***  0.263  0.703***  0.210  
N 6826 6827 6815 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.001. 
 
 
Table 7. Results of Multinomial Analysis (N=6,815) 
Variables 
Asset poor only  
vs. 
Income and asset poor  
Income poor only 
vs. 
Income and asset poor  
Asset poor 
vs. 
Income and Asset non-poor   
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Household head’s Characteristics        
   Gender (ref: Male) -0.079  0.160  0.161  0.183  0.311***  0.080  
   Age categories (ref: 20-29)       
30-39  -0.531  0.556  0.430  0.736  0.299  0.218  
40-49 -0.660  0.547  0.513  0.725  0.306  0.214  
50-59 -0.248  0.571  0.481  0.750  0.454**  0.226  
60 and above  -0.620  0.604  0.053  0.789  0.755***  0.250  
   Ethnic groups (ref: Han) -0.434  0.337  -0.100  0.403  0.045  0.171  
   Political party (ref: not a Communist 
party member) 
-0.001  0.165  0.012  0.193  0.353***  0.077  
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   Marital status (ref: not married) -0.117  0.280  0.057  0.332  0.498***  0.139  
Employment (ref: unemployed)  0.236  0.196  0.049  0.226  0.166  0.101  
Education (ref: <high school)        
High school or equivalent 0.246  0.155  0.051  0.181  0.168**  0.080  
Two- or three-year college 0.866***  0.277  0.634**  0.312  0.514***  0.110  
Four-year college or above 0.914**  0.378  0.426  0.443  0.440***  0.140  
   Health condition (1=very good) 0.426**  0.190  0.238  0.221  -0.035  0.083  
Household Characteristics          
   Household size 0.125  0.105  -0.091  0.127  -0.090*  0.050  
   Whether having children (ref: no) -0.222  0.189  -0.124  0.218  0.096  0.095  
   Whether having older adults (ref: no) 0.314  0.232  0.386  0.273  -0.115  0.111  
   Homeownership (ref: no) -0.059  0.172  0.262  0.207  0.263***  0.087  
   Province of residence (ref: Beijing)       
        Liaoning -0.846*  0.487  -0.052  0.527  -0.737***  0.211  
        Jiangsu 0.140  0.521  -0.746  0.599  -0.687***  0.207  
        Guangdong -0.596  0.547  -0.065  0.590  -0.076  0.239  
        Shanxi -0.067  0.495  -0.920  0.563  -1.434***  0.202  
        Anhui 0.231  0.536  -0.199  0.596  -1.076***  0.212  
        Henan -0.030  0.506  -0.506  0.566  -0.991***  0.205  
        Hubei -0.392  0.490  -0.443  0.541  -1.131***  0.204  
        Chongqing -0.674  0.531  -0.958  0.602  -1.005***  0.240  
        Sichuan -1.307  0.479  -0.702  0.521  -0.875***  0.216  
        Yunnan 0.441  0.503  -0.795  0.574  -1.646***  0.200  
        Gansu -0.193  0.517  -1.393**  0.623  -1.399***  0.215  
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.001. 
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Results of multinomial model. We conduct a multinomial analysis to compare the four categories 
described in Figure 2. Income poverty and liquid asset poverty are defined by the poverty line of the 
self-reported minimum expenditure (Panel III of Table 5) since the proportion of income-poor 
households identified by the MLS or Khan’s poverty line is relatively low (2%-3%). Unlike those 
analyses using logit models (Table 6), these analyses exclude income as an independent variable 
because the dependent measure already carries such information.  
Table 7 reports three sets of comparisons. The first set contrasts the probability of being both 
income and asset poor with that of being asset poor only. The second set compares the likelihood of 
being both income and asset poor with that of being income poor only. The final one compares the 
probability of not being poor with the probability of being asset poor only. The reference category 
in the first two sets of comparisons is the group who is both income and asset poor, apparently the 
most vulnerable among the four. Results of the comparison suggest that the reference category 
differs from the asset-poor-only and the income-poor-only groups mainly in the human capital of 
household heads. Households headed by individuals with some college or those with “very good” 
health are less likely to live in both income and asset poverty. The third set of comparisons uses the 
asset-poor-only group as the reference category. Among those without income poverty, asset-poor 
households are likely to be bigger in size and to be renters. Heads of asset-poor households are 
more likely to be male, unmarried, younger than 50, less educated, and not a member of the 
Communist party. These findings are consistent with those of Model 3 in Table 6.  
Asset poverty from development perspective 
All of the above analyses focus on asset-poverty measures defined by the insurance role of 
household assets. We also examine asset-poverty status from the perspective of long-term economic 
development. First, we compare household liquid assets of the unemployed with the mean family 
business value of those owning a family business (16,913 yuan). Assuming the mean family business 
value as a necessary startup fund for a small business, this comparison shows that more than half of 
households headed by the unemployed (53%) do not have sufficient funds for business startup. 
Second, if using 20% of the median house value as the asset-poverty threshold (14,000 yuan), about 
60% of renters are asset poor. Finally, nearly one-fourth of households with children own liquid 
assets below the average annual college tuition in 2002 (5,000 yuan). 
Discussion 
Precautionary savings 
This study examines asset distribution and asset-poverty rates in urban China, and reports 
characteristics of asset-poor households. Consistent with previous studies on household savings in 
China (Chamon & Prasad, 2010; Meng, 2003), our analysis of asset distribution shows that urban 
households have strong motives for precautionary savings. Previous research shows that the average 
household savings rate in urban China rose from 17% in 1995 to 24% in 2005 (Chamon & Prasad, 
2010), 12 percentage points higher than the Asian average (Baldacci et al., 2010). Long and Zhou 
(2000) estimate that the coefficient of prudence, a measure of the strength of precautionary savings, 
is 5.2 in China, much higher than that in the US (Dynan, 1993), indicating a high level of 
precautionary savings. Although this study does not directly test the strength of precautionary 
savings in urban China, it shows that mean household liquid assets is slightly higher than mean 
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annual household income, a large ratio compared to other countries. For instance, Spanish 
temporary workers hold average liquid assets equivalent to four to five months’ earnings (Barceló & 
Villanueva, 2010). Kennickell and Lusardi (2005) identify the ratio of desired precautionary savings 
over normal income as a median value of around 10% in the US. In addition, the study finds that 
about half of income-poor households have sufficient assets to cover their consumption needs for 
three months. It has been estimated that, in developed countries, about 20% of income-poor 
households are not asset poor (Brandolini, Magri, & Smeeding, 2010). It appears that this percentage 
is much higher in China, indicating that a high proportion of income-poor households save for an 
emergency. 
A number of factors, including cultural influence, habit formation, and demographic characteristics, 
may explain the strong motivation for precautionary savings and the high savings rates in China. 
However, as suggested by Chamon and Prasad (2010), perhaps these high rates are best explained by 
the inadequacy of social protection programs and the rising burden of expenditures on housing, 
education, and health care. The privatization and commercialization of public services has 
aggressively replaced the universal basic health care and education established prior to the reform. 
Along with increasing income uncertainty, public provision of social services continues to decline, 
which forms an institutional context that profoundly shapes households’ motivations for saving.  
Deep asset poverty 
Partially due to strong motivation to accrue precautionary savings and relatively high savings rates, 
asset-poverty rates estimated above are lower compared to those for developed countries 
(Brandolini, Magri, & Smeeding, 2010). For example, the highest liquid-asset-poverty rate (21%) 
estimated by this study is 12 percentage points lower than that of Italy in the same period of time, 
and is less than 50% of liquid asset-poverty rates in Germany and the UK. Compared to other 
countries, urban households in China have higher income-poverty rates than net-worth poverty 
rates. However, like in other countries, the liquid-asset-poverty rate in China is much higher than the 
income-poverty rate. The liquid-asset-poverty rate based on the MLS poverty line is five times as 
high as the income-poverty rate, but this ratio was only 3.4 in the US in 1999. Asset poverty, 
especially liquid asset poverty, appears to be a severe problem in urban China.  
Most asset-poor households barely have any assets, which should raise a concern for policymakers. 
This is because income uncertainty has increased significantly since China’s economic reform, and 
risk of poverty due to negative income shocks is widespread. With transitory income variance 
increasing from .04 in 1990 to .16 in 2004, households with extremely low assets are more likely to 
experience economic hardship, fall into transient poverty, or become persistently poor.  
In addition, many households without any assets do not have access to public assistance when 
needed. Public expenditure on social programs in China is still low, and only 4% of households in 
the sample received public assistance in 2002. As a result, family economic resources have become 
vitally important, especially in areas such as education and health services.  
Last but not least, asset-poor households are likely to be excluded from opportunities for economic 
development simply because they do not have assets. As our analyses show, much higher asset-
poverty rates are defined by the lack of sufficient funds for business start-up, home downpayment, 
or college tuition than those defined by consumption smoothing. 
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Interactions between demographics and policy transitions 
This study suggests that impacts of household demographics on asset poverty are shaped by the 
unique policy context of urban China. Specifically, household asset accumulation has been affected 
by interactions of demographic changes and institutional settings. Research on asset distribution 
already shows the importance of institutional structures (Chamon & Prasad, 2010; Davis & Feng, 
2009; Feng, He, & Sato, 2009; Meng, 2003; Wei & Zhang, 2009; Zhao & Ding, 2008). Policy and 
structural changes are highly related to current income poverty in China (World Bank, 2009). Many 
policy transitions and economic reform processes that have contributed to economic success and 
wealth accumulation may also have created challenges, such as wealth inequality and risk of asset 
poverty.  
We mainly discuss several demographic characteristics here—party affiliation, gender, children, age, 
and region of residence. Households led by Chinese Communist party members are consistently 
better off than their counterparts in all analyses probably because of the role and power party 
members have in the policymaking process, especially during economic and policy transitions. For 
example, individuals with a higher political status can acquire their occupancies at more heavily 
subsidized prices (Meng, 2007). Urban home ownership is only one example of how individual-level 
political capital and ties to the party-state have shaped asset inequality in the capitalist era. The party 
organization and officials continue to hoard asset-accumulation opportunities and extract high rent 
in post-socialist China. 
In contrast to households in developed countries, households in China headed by females are less 
likely to be asset poor in this study. Previous literature (Meng, 2007) also reports that households 
headed by females accumulate more assets than those headed by males. A possible explanation is 
that, generally occupying a domestic role in the household, women in China are more sensitive to 
the decline of public services and increase of private burdens of education and health care. For 
instance, shares of educational and health expenditures in the household budget increased by about 
eight and five times, respectively, from 1988 to 2003 (World Bank, 2009). Households headed by 
females, therefore, may develop stronger motivations to accrue precautionary savings. Previous 
research suggests that households with children have a savings rate five percentage points higher 
than childless households (Baldacci et al., 2010). Similarly, this study finds that households with 
children are less likely to be asset poor after controlling for household size, probably because they 
are more likely to be concerned about future income uncertainty and have greater motivation to 
avoid economic hardship. Households with children also try to be financially prepared in response 
to rapidly growing educational expenditures. It is estimated that college tuitions rose four times from 
1997 to 2006 (Liu et al., 2011). Another policy-related demographic factor is that, in younger 
generations, there is a high sex ratio imbalance partly due to a preference for sons in the “one child” 
policy; because of this imbalance, parents of male children strive to save in order to enhance their 
sons’ competitiveness on the marriage market (Wei & Zhang, 2009). 
The first two models in Table 6 report that households headed by older adults (aged 60 or above) 
have the lowest asset-poverty rate. This seems to contradict the life-cycle theory, which hypothesizes 
that household assets peak at pre-retirement age. This discrepancy may be explained by China’s 
pension reform in the mid-1990s, which has essentially reduced the income replacement rate for 
older adults and stimulated their savings rate (Feng, He, & Sato, 2009). Interestingly, household 
heads’ age, as a measure of the life-cycle theory, shows an insignificant association with asset poverty 
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when the asset-poverty line used is based on the self-reported minimum expenditure (Model 3 of 
Table 6). Different from the other poverty lines used in the first two models, the one based on the 
self-reported minimum expenditure may better capture the dynamics of consumption, concerns 
about income uncertainty, and purposes of asset accumulation at different life stages. Basically, it 
suggests that all age groups in urban China have developed strong motivations to save in response to 
drastic structural changes in the economy and policy. As argued by Chamon and Prasad (2010), 
younger households accumulate assets for housing, education, and career development, while older 
households prepare for uncertain health expenditures and supplemental retirement income.  
Finally, regarding region of residence, households in the eastern region are less likely to be asset 
poor than households in other regions; Beijing and Guangdong have the lowest asset-poverty rates. 
This geographic disparity is essentially a consequence of institutional arrangements that favor large 
cities or select regions. The country’s highly decentralized fiscal system continues to favor 
eastern/coastal regions where more fiscal resources and public spending have been seen. Despite 
the central government’s efforts to invest in western regions, it is still the eastern and coastal regions 
where substantially more economic resources and opportunities are concentrated. Results in Table 7 
also show that geographic indicators may be used to distinguish the wealthy from the poor (Column 
3), but not the poorer from the poor (Columns 1 and 2). This is consistent with the fact that poverty 
is widespread in China. In addition, this result implies the common lack of sufficient social 
protection and social assistance for vulnerable populations across different regions, despite the fact 
that economic growth opportunities vary across provinces/regions.  
Policy implications 
Research on asset distribution in Chinese households is interested in two policy questions in general. 
One is how to change household saving behaviors and boost domestic consumption. Currently, the 
consumption level is still relatively low in China, with a ratio of household consumption to GDP at 
37% (Baldacci et al., 2010), although there have been proposals to stimulate consumption, such as 
increasing public expenditures on social programs and developing financial markets (Baldacci et al., 
2010; Chamon & Prasad, 2010). The other question seeks to answer what can be done at the policy 
level to address the problem of upside-down redistribution of wealth as well as reduce asset 
inequality. Zhao and Ding (2008) suggest policies must prevent rent-seeking activities in housing and 
create progressive tax instruments (i.e., an inheritance tax) to correct wealth inequality.  
These suggested policy approaches, if adopted, can also protect asset-poor households from 
economic hardship and from exclusion from economic development. For example, if social 
assistance programs or other policy measures are in place, asset-poor households may be spared 
economic insecurity and hardship. Although all populations may benefit from the development of 
financial markets and increasing social expenditures, it is important to emphasize a pro-poor 
approach in these policies. For example, appropriate financial products and services, such as a credit 
market combined with the subsidies for postsecondary education and small business, could be 
considered specifically for financially vulnerable families.  
Research on asset poverty also has important implications for a broader agenda of poverty reduction 
in China. As suggested by the World Bank (2009), poverty in China is largely attributable to risk, and 
transient poverty has become the main form of poverty. About 40% of poverty cases are caused by 
the inability to cope with income loss, health shocks, or other risks (World Bank, 2009). Even with a 
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strengthened social safety net, asset building ought to be an integral part of development-oriented 
strategies for poverty reduction. 
Institutional infrastructure is significant in facilitating asset building among vulnerable populations 
(Sherraden, 1991; Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 2003). The asset poor may need even stronger 
incentives for asset building. There have been examples of well-designed policy settings that 
successfully encourage the poor to build assets. For example, Individual Development Accounts in 
the US provide financial education and a savings match to encourage asset building among the poor. 
The United Kingdom Child Trust Fund (which, unfortunately, ceased in 2011) provided seed funds 
to households with children to start a savings and investment account and to facilitate savings for 
the next generation. In Singapore, the Central Provident Fund, a comprehensive social insurance 
savings plan, has been successful over several generations (Vasoo & Lee, 2006). These policy 
examples provide valuable experiences for China to learn from when developing its own pro-poor 
asset-building programs. Summarizing lessons from Individual Development Accounts in the US, 
Beverly and Sherraden (1999) identify a practical framework which includes several institutional 
constructs (i.e., access, knowledge, incentives, and so on) that aim to promote asset accumulation 
among the poor. This framework can be used as a general guide for designing and developing asset-
building programs that benefit poor citizens in contrast to tax instruments, for example, that may be 
less favorable for asset building because poor people generally do not have access to these 
instruments. Also, creative strategies can be explored to accommodate conditions specific to China, 
such as strong motivations of households to accrue precautionary savings and ongoing policy 
transitions (i.e., low public spending on social protection and social services). In a word, institutional 
arrangements should be put in place to promote asset building among the poor.   
Finally, some specific findings of the study have implications for policy practice. For example, asset-
building policy may target female members of a household since they may have a keen motivation to 
save for precautionary reasons. For households without children, stronger incentives may be 
provided to encourage asset building. Results in Table 7 also indicate that education is the key to 
lifting income- and asset-poor households out of poverty. Previous research has repeatedly identified 
education as a critical determinant of welfare outcomes (World Bank, 2009). 
Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, the study uses data collected in 2002, which may not 
accurately reflect asset distribution and asset poverty in today’s China. More recent data, when it 
becomes available, should be used in future research to examine these questions. Second, although 
asset inequality and household asset poverty can be explained to a large extent by economic and 
policy transitions in China, we do not investigate what unequal opportunities for asset accumulation 
were created by these transitions or how low-income people were excluded. Third, although it 
identifies asset-poor households in urban China, this study does not examine how these households 
cope with economic hardship. Fourth, the validity of the asset-poverty lines adopted in this study is 
debatable. Therefore, as a precaution, we use different poverty lines, and also note that findings 
from these different measures are mostly consistent. Finally, the study does not compare asset-
poverty rates between urban and rural China, which is an important research question for further 
investigation.   
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Conclusion 
To conclude, the study estimates asset-poverty rates with three asset indicators and three asset-
poverty lines. Overall, China’s asset-poverty rates are lower than those of developed countries. This 
is, in part, due to the low poverty standards and Chinese households’ strong motivation to accrue 
precautionary savings and high savings rates. Despite these low asset-poverty rates, asset poverty still 
appears to be a serious problem as indicated by the ratio of the liquid asset-poverty rate to the 
income-poverty rate. Noticeably, the asset-poverty-gap ratio shows that most households in asset 
poverty have zero liquid assets or negative net worth. In other words, they are the poorest, lacking 
any form of economic resources for backup. To exacerbate this situation, social protection programs 
in China are poorly funded, which places asset-poor households at a high risk of economic hardship. 
The study also shows that asset poverty is affected by the interplay of demographic characteristics 
and institutional settings. In order to encourage poor people to accumulate assets, it is crucial to 
promote asset-building policy innovations that target vulnerable populations. 
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